Abstract. Shared understanding and collective power are social phenomena that serve as a form of glue between individual persons. They easily emerge and often involve both cognitive and affective aspects. As the behaviour of each person is based on complex internal mental processes involving, for example, own goals, emotions and beliefs, it would be expected that such sharedness and collectiveness is very hard to achieve. Apparently, specific mechanisms are required to tune the individual mental processes to each other in order to enable the emergence of shared mental states and collective behaviour. Having knowledge about these mechanisms in a biological context provides a basis to modelling corresponding mechanisms in a compuational setting. From a biological perspective, mirror neurons and internal simulation are core concepts to explain the mechanisms underlying such social phenomena. In this paper it is discussed how based on such neurological concepts computational mechanisms can be identified to obtain human-like social agent models. It is discussed how these social agent models indeed are an adequate basis for the emergence of shared understanding and collective power in groups of agents.
Introduction
In society often some form of 'sharedness' of understanding or 'collectiveness' of action is experienced, which usually covers both cognitive and affective dimensions. Although this is a very common type of social phenomenon, at forehand it is not at all clear how it can emerge. For example, the experience of feeling good being part of a group with a shared understanding and collective action may be experienced as quite natural. However, as persons in a group are autonomous agents with their own neurological structures and patterns, carrying, for example, their own emotions, beliefs, desires and intentions, it would be more reasonable to expect that such sharedness and collectiveness is impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, often groups develop coherent views and decisions, and, even more surprisingly, the group members seem to share a positive feeling with it. These processes depend on possibilities for informational and emotional transfer between individuals, which can be enhanced by technological infrastructure such as social media.
In recent years by developments in neuroscience new light has been shed on this seeming paradox of individuality versus sharedness and collectiveness. This has led to the new discipline called Social Neuroscience; e.g., [9] , [10] , [19] , [20] , [28] . Two interrelated core concepts in this discipline are mirror neurons and internal simulation of another person's mental processes. Mirror neurons are neurons that not only have the function to prepare for a certain action or body change, but are also activated upon observing somebody else who is performing this action or body change; e.g., [34] , [45] , [51] . Internal simulation is internal mental processing that copies processes that may take place in externally, for example, mental processes in another individual; e.g., [13] , [15] , [24] , [26] , [30] . Mechanisms involving these core concepts have been described that provide an explanation of the emergence of sharedness and collectiveness from a biological perspective. Formalisation of such mechanisms from a computational perspective provides a basis for the design of human-like social agent models, able to show similar patterns of emerging shared understanding and collective action.
The type of biologically inspired human-like social agent models discussed in this paper have a number of possible application areas. In the first place they can be used for the analysis of human social processes in groups, crowds or in societies as a whole. Examples of this are the analysis of collective decision making in groups, crowd behaviour in emergency situations, social contagion of emotions and opinions, and the development of societal or political movements. A second area of application addresses analysis and design of socio-technological systems including, for example, social media. This concerns groups of agents that partly consist of human agents and partly of artificial agents in the form of devices such as smartphones, and the use of human-made infrastructure for communication such as Internet and social media. For such socio-technological systems it can not only be analysed what patterns may emerge under which circumstances, but the focus can also be on the design of these devices and media, in order to create a situation in which the right types of patterns emerge, for example, to enable safe evacuation in emergency situations. A third possible area of application concerns close empathic interaction and emotional attachment between a human and a device.
In this paper, first in Section 2 the concepts of mirror neurons and internal simulation as mentioned are briefly reviewed. Next, in Section 3 it is discussed how based on biological mechanisms involving these concepts shared understanding can emerge. This covers both cognitive and affective understanding, and in a combined form empathic understanding. In Section 4 biological mechanisms are discussed enabling the emerge of collective decisions and actions, and it is shown how such collective actions can be grounded in shared cognitive and affective understanding. Section 5 illustrates how such biological mechanisms can be formalised as computational mechanisms in human-like social agent models, and in Section 6 it is pointed out how such models can be simplified by using certain abstraction methods. Finally, Section 7 is a discussion.
Mirror Neurons, Internal Simulation and Social Neuroscience
In this section mirror neurons and internal simulation of another person's mental processes are briefly discussed. Together these concepts are a basis for biological mechanisms that realise an individual's mental function of mirroring mental processes of another individual. This function plays a crucial role in enabling the emergence of shared understanding and collective action, as will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
The Discovery of Mirror Neurons
Recently it has been found that in humans a specific type of neurons exists, called mirror neurons, which both are active when the person prepares for certain actions or bodily changes and when the person observes such actions or body states of other persons. The discovery of mirror neurons originates from single cell recording experiments with monkeys in Parma in the 1990s. In particular, the focus was on an area in the premotor cortex (F5) involved in the preparation of grasp actions. To their own surprise, the researchers discovered that some of the recorded cells were not only firing when the monkey was preparing a grasp action, but also when somebody in the lab was grasping something and the monkey just observed that; cf. [23] , [48] ; see also [34] , [50] , [51] . The highly unexpected element was that sensory processing of observed actions of others involves neurons that are also involved the subject's preparation for the same type of action. Traditionally sensory processing was assumed to be separate from preparing. It turned out that in the premotor area F5 about 20% of the neurons are both active when preparing and when observing the action.
After the discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys it has been hypothesized that similar types of neurons also occur in humans. Indeed, for humans from the usual imaging methods it can be found that in certain premotor areas activity occurs both when an action is observed and when the action is prepared; e.g., [11] , [25] based on EEG data; [27] , [49] based on PET data, [36] based on fMRI. However, due to limitations in resolution, from such methods it cannot be found whether the neurons active in action observation are exactly the same neurons as those that are active in preparing for an action. In principle they could be different neurons in the same area. Therefore in the years after the discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys it has been subject to debate whether they also exist in humans; e.g., [31] .
In recent years the existence of mirror neurons in humans has found support in single cell experiments with epilepsy patients undergoing pre-surgical evaluation of the foci of epilepsy; cf. [21] , [43] ; see also [34] , pp. 201-203; [35] , [38] . In these experiments for 14 patients the activity of approximately 500 neurons was recorded; they were located in three sectors of the mesial frontal cortex (the ventral and dorsal sectors of the anterior cingulate cortex and the pre-supplementary motor cortex (SMA)/SMA proper complex). The subjects were tested both for hand-grasping actions and for emotional face expressions. Some of the main findings were that neurons with mirror neuron properties were found in all sites in the mesial frontal cortex where recording took place, in total for approximately 12% of all recorded neurons; about half of them related to hand-grasping, and the other half to emotional face expressions; cf. [35] .
Neurons for Control and Self-Other Distinction
Due to the multiple functions of mirror neurons, the functional meaning of activation of them (e.g., preparing or observing an action, or both) in principle is contextdependent. The context determines in which cases their activation is meant to lead to actual execution of the action (e.g., in self-initiated action performance, or imitation), and in which cases it is not (e.g., in action observation and interpretation). A specific set of neurons has been found, sometimes called super mirror neurons that seem to be able to indicate such a context and play a role in the control of actual execution of a prepared action. These neurons are suggested to exert control by allowing or suppressing action execution and/or preparation states. More specifically, in the single cell recording experiments with epileptic patients mentioned above, also cells were found that are active when the person prepares an own action that is executed, but shut down when the action is only observed. This has led to the hypothesis that these cells may be involved in the functional distinction between a preparation state activated in order to actually perform the action, a preparation state activated to interpret an observed action, or both (in case of imitation). In [34] , pp. 201-202 it is also described that some of such cells are sensitive to a specific person, so that the action can be attributed to the specific person that was observed: self-other distinction; see also [7] . More details on such super mirror neurons can be found in [7] , [35] , and [34] , pp. 196-203.
Generating Emotions and Feelings by Internal Simulation: As-If Body Loops
Activation of mirror neurons is important not by itself, but because it plays a crucial role in an important mental function: mirroring mental processes of other persons by internal simulation. How mirroring relates to internal processes involving emotions and feelings may ask for some further explanation. A classical view on emotions is that based on some sensory input indicated by a stimulus s, due to internal processing associated emotions are felt, and subsequently these emotions are expressed in some body state b; e.g., a face expression: sensory representation of s  felt emotion  preparation for body state b  expressed body state b = expressed emotion James [37] claimed a different direction of causality (see also [17] , pp. 114-116): sensory representation of s  preparation for body state b  expressed body state b  emotion felt = based on sensory representation of (sensed) body state b
The perspective of James assumes that a body loop is used to generate and feel an emotion. Damasio made an important further step by introducing the possibility of an as-if body loop bypassing actually expressed bodily changes; cf. [13] , pp. 155-158; [15] , pp. 79-80; [16] , [17] An as-if body loop describes an internal simulation of the bodily processes, without actually affecting the body, comparable to simulation in order to perform, for example, prediction, mindreading or imagination; e.g., [2] , [24] , [26] , [30] ; see also [6] , [29] for computational accounts. The feelings generated in this way play an important role in valuing predicted or imagined effects of actions (see, e.g., [42] , [44] ). Note that, in contrast to James [37] , Damasio [13] distinguishes an emotion (or emotional response) from a feeling (or felt emotion). A brief survey of Damasio's ideas about emotion and feeling can be found in ( [17] , pp. 108-129). According to this perspective emotions relate to actions, whereas feelings relate to perceptions: Note that Damasio refers to a 'tightly bound cycle' between emotion and feeling states. Emotion and feeling in principle mutually affect each other in a bidirectional manner; in turn the preparation of the bodily response is also affected by the state of feeling the emotion (cf. [16] , and [17] , pp. 119-122)):
'The brain has a direct means to respond to the object as feelings unfold because the object at the origin is inside the body, rather than external to it. The brain can act directly on the very object it is perceiving. It can do so by modifying the state of the object, or by altering the transmission of signals from it. The object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain map of that object on the other, can influence each other in a sort of reverberative process that is not to be found, for example, in the perception of an external object.' (…) 'In other words, feelings are not a passive perception or a flash in time, especially not in the case of feelings of joy and sorrow. For a while after an occasion of such feelings begins -for seconds or for minutes -there is a dynamic engagement of the body, almost certainly in a repeated fashion, and a subsequent dynamic variation of the perception. We perceive a series of transitions. We sense an interplay, a give and take.' ( [16] , pp. 91-92) So, an as-if body loop usually occurs in a cyclic form by assuming that the emotion felt in turn affects the prepared bodily changes (see also 'Emotions work when images processed in the brain call into action a number of emotion-triggering regions, for example, the amygdala or special regions of the frontal lobe cortex. Once any of these trigger regions is activated, certain consequences ensue -chemical molecules are secreted by endocrine glands and by subcorticol nuclei and delivered to both the brain and the body (e.g., cortisol in the case of fear), certain actions are taken (e.g., fleeing or freezing; contraction of the gut, again in the case of fear), and certain expressions are assumed (e.g., a face and posture of terror).' ( [17] , p. 110)
Note that here a role of the amygdala is indicated in the process of generating an emotion, whereas in earlier times often the amygdala was related to feelings. In contrast, Damasio describes the substrate for feelings as follows: ' In the late 1980s I hypothesized a role for the somatosensory cortices in feelings, and I pointed to the insula as a likely provider of feelings. I wanted to move away from the hopeless idea of attributing the origin of feeling states to action-driving regions, such as the amygdalae.' ( [17] , p. 118)
At that time this idea had a rather hypothetical character, and was not the accepted view. This changed after 2000:
'Since 2000, however, we have known that activity in the insula is indeed an important correlate for every conceivable kind of feeling (…) The idea that the insular cortex is an important substrate for feelings is certainly correct. (…) The anterior cingulate cortex tends to become active in parallel with the insula when we experience feelings. The insula and anterior cingulate are closely interlocked regions, the two being joined by multiple connections. The insula has dual sensory and motor functions, albeit biased toward the sensory side of the process, while the anterior cingulate operates as a motor structure.' ( [17] , p. 118)
In addition to these, the process of generating a feeling involves several subcortical regions for certain preprocessing as well, as 'they are the first recipients of information from the viscera and internal milieu with the ability to integrate signals from the entire range of the body's interior' ( [17] , pp. 118-119).
This provides a cyclic process that (for a constant environment) can lead to equilibrium states for feelings and emotional responses, as shown, for example, in [6] by a computational model.
Mirroring: Mirror Neuron Activation and Internal Simulation
From a more general viewpoint, as-if body loops as introduced in [13] contribute:
(1) sensory input directly affects preparation states, after which further internal processing takes place (in line with, e.g., [37] ) (2) the notion of internal simulation involving body representations (in line with, e.g., [2] , [30] ).
Here (1) breaks with the tradition that there is a standard order of processing sensinginternal processing -preparation for action, and (2) allows for involving changing body representations in internal processes without actually having to change any body state. As mirror neurons make that some specific sensory input (an observed person) directly links to related preparation states, just like (1) above, it fits quite well in the perspective based on as-if body loops. In this way mirroring is a process that fully integrates mirror neuron activation states in the ongoing internal simulation processes based on as-if loops; see also [17] , pp. 102-104. This mirroring process is schematically shown in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1: Mirroring process based on mirror neuron activation and internal simulation
Here the preparation for body state b (e.g., some emotional response) can either be triggered by sensing an external stimulus s associating to b, or by observing somebody else performing b (upper part of Fig. 1 ). In both cases, as a first step the sensory representation affects the preparation state, after which further internal processing takes place based on the as-if body loop (lower part in Fig. 1 ) which in turn affects both the related feeling and the preparation state. Note that, as this mirroring process happens mostly in an unconscious manner, in a social context mirroring imposes limitations on the freedom for individuals to have their own personal emotions, beliefs, intentions, and actions.
Development of the Discipline Social Neuroscience
Above it has been pointed out how by mirroring, internal processes and states of other persons lead to activation of a person's corresponding own processes and states. The latter processes and states at the same time play a crucial role in the person's own feelings and actions. Metaphorically spoken, mirroring has not been designed as a separate mental function with data stuctures and processes fully disjoint from the other mental functions; instead mirroring is fully integrated in the agent's own mental processes and uses shared data stuctures and processes. This integration provides an effective mechanism for how actions and feelings of other persons and own actions and feelings affect each other. This biological mechanism explains how in a social context persons fundamentally tune their personal actions and states to each others, including their feelings. Given these implications, the discovery of mirror neurons and how they play their role in mirroring processes is considered a crucial step for the further development of the disciplines of social cognition and social psychology, by providing a biological basis for social phenomena. Many examples of social phenomena now can be explained by relating them to biological mechanisms that realise mirroring, for example:
 social diffusion or contagion of personal states (e.g., opinions or emotions)  empathic understanding  group formation, group cohesion  collective decision making Based on these developments, and their wide applicability the new discipline Social Neuroscience has shown a fast development; e.g., [9] , [10] , [19] , [20] , [28] . The impact of this discipline is very wide, as it is considered to cover not only the items indicated above, but also the concept of social reality (e.g., [8] ), spiritual and religious experience (e.g., [52] ), and collective consciousness or global empathy and its role in the future evolution (e.g., [12] , [47] ). In the next two sections it will be discussed in some more detail how different types of shared understanding and collective power can emerge based on the mirroring function.
The Emergence of Shared Understanding
Understanding can be viewed as a relation between an internal mental state and the world state to which the understanding refers. It can occur in different types, that can be distinguished from each side of the relation: from the internal mental state side, and from the side of the concerning world state to which the understanding refers. First distinctions from the former (internal state) side are discussed, and next distinctions from the latter (world state) side.
An agent can have an understanding of a world state by generating and maintaining an internal cognitive state in relation to it (e.g., one or more beliefs about it). This can be distinguished as a cognitive type of understanding. An agent can also form and maintain an internal affective state in relation to a world state (e.g., a specific emotion or feeling associated to it). Such a form of understanding can be distinguished as an affective type of understanding. An important role of this type of understanding is that it provides a basis for experiencing in the understanding. Affective and cognitive understanding are often related to each other. Within a person, any cognitive state relates to an associated emotional response which based on an as-if body loop involving a sensory representation of a body state which is the basis of the related feeling (e.g., [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] ); see also Section 2. When mirroring takes place for both the cognitive and affective state, this provides a mechanism to obtain shared understanding integrating cognitive and affective aspects. For the case of similar neural architectures, the (bidirectional) associations between cognitive state and emotion in an observing agent are similar to these associations in an observed agent. This will further strengthen the shared integrated cognitive and affective understanding; more extreme cases of this occur in identical twins.
A second way of distinguishing different types of understanding is by considering differentiations of the concerning world state to which the understanding refers. The world can be conceptualised as a kind of landscape in which agents occur as active, living entities. The internal processes of the agents are also part of the world, and can be distinguished from agent-independent aspects of the landscape. Given this picture, understanding may refer to either an agent-external world state or an agent-internal world state. For example, having beliefs about another agent's emotions, beliefs or goals is of the second, agent-internal type, whereas having beliefs about the weather is of the first type.
The two dimensions of distinctions for types of understanding introduced above can be applied to shared understanding of an agent B with an agent A, from which a matrix results as illustrated in Table 1with different examples. Table 2 . For example, an understanding shared in population C is that the climate is changing, but this is not due to human action, it has a natural cause. As another example, a shared understanding in population D is that the climate is not changing, and this is due to human action (e.g., without human action the temperature would have a decreasing trend, but human action compensates for this). An example of a shared combined cognitive-affective agent-external understanding is sharing a belief that climate change has some serious effects and sharing a bad feeling about that, or sharing a belief that a new iPad will come out soon and sharing a good feeling about that. Obtaining such shared understanding of the external world may make use of different means. Individual information gathering can play a role, but also verbal and nonverbal interaction between agents. If some external world state is considered by agents, both verbal and nonverbal expressions are input for mirroring processes. These mirroring processes affect, for example, both the strength by which something is believed about this state, and the strength of the feeling associated to it. Thus both cognitive and affective shared understanding can develop, based on (mostly unconscious) mirroring processes.
The Emergence of Shared Understanding for Agent-Internal States
A second type of understanding concerns world states that are internal for one of the agents in the world. For such understanding different terms are used; e.g., mindreading, Theory of Mind (ToM), empathy, or more specific terms such as emotion or intention recognition; e.g., [20] , [26] , [46] . Also here understanding may be limited to cognitive understanding; for example, believing that another person has the intention to go out for a dinner, or believing that this person feels depressed. However, for humans also an affective type of mutual understanding is common, usually combined with some form of cognitive understanding. One of the most fundamental forms of mutual understanding is indicated by the notion of empathy; e.g., see [18] , [20] , [34] , [46] , [53] , [54] , [57] . Originally by Lipps [40] the notion was named by the German word 'einfühlung' which could be translated as 'feeling into'; e.g., [46] . As this word indicates more explicitly, the notion of empathy has a strong relation to feeling: empathic understanding includes experiencing what the other person feels, but also believing that the experienced feeling is felt by the other person, based on self-other distinction (a form of super mirroring). Therefore empathic understanding can be considered a form of combined affective and cognitive understanding; see also [53] , [54] . As an example, in [57] , and [18] , p. 435, the following four criteria of empathy of B for A are formulated:
( The understanding indeed is both affective (1) and cognitive (4), but in this case it concerns in particular an affective state and not a cognitive state of the other person. Therefore it can be called affective-focused empathy. In contrast, to indicate affective and cognitive understanding of another agent's cognitive state (e.g., a belief) the term cognitive-focused empathy may be used. The term full empathy can be used to indicate combined cognitive-affective understanding of both cognitive and (associated) affective states of another agent. Note that empathy always involves feelings, so this is also the case, for example, in cognitive-focused empathy. However, in case of full empathy these feelings are related to the other person (using self-other distinction), and in case of purely cognitive-focused empathy the feelings are experienced, but not related to the other person (for example, due to impaired selfother distinction). Table 3 illustrates these types of understanding for agent B having understanding of states of agent A. That mirroring (together with super mirroring) provides a basic mechanism involved in the creation of empathic understanding has much support in the recent literature; e.g., [22] , [53] , [54] , [57] , or [34, pp. 106-129]. Having a belief but no feeling for A's emotion and belief (ToM)
Affective and cognitive understanding
Having both a belief and feeling for A's emotion (affective-focused empathy)
Having both a belief and feeling for A's belief (cognitive-focused empathy)
Having a belief and feeling for A's belief and feeling (full empathy)
The Emergence of Collective Power
Each individual person can exert a certain amount and direction of power by his or her actions, depending on personal characteristics and states. In a situation where such powers are exerted in different directions by multiple individuals, they can easily annihilate each other, or, metaphorically spoken, result in a kind of Brownian motion where particles move back and forth but do not change place much. In cases that the individual momenta (the individual powers and their directions) have an arbitrary distribution over a population, no serious collective momentum will emerge.
The Emergence of Collective Action Based on Mirroring
To obtain emergence of collective power, the individual momenta should converge to a similar direction so that a collective momentum can result. Using another metaphor, this is what happens in the universe when, for example, comets or planets are formed out of smaller particles, based on mutual attraction based on gravitation. More specifically, to obtain collective action within groups of agents, by some mutual tuning process by mirroring, shared agent states have to emerge that in an anticipatory sense relate to action, and by which collective power can be developed. Types of internal states relating to action are intentions or preparations. They can be seen as tendencies to perform a specific action; the emergence of shared preparations by mirroring may be quite effective in this sense. However, individual internal processes also play an important role in deciding about actions. In generating actions or behaviours usually options are prepared for which a choice has to be made, and to one of which an ownership or commitment has to be developed. In the recent cognitive and neurological literature much can be found on the mechanisms behind developing ownership of an action (e.g., [59] , [60] ). In this literature a distinction is made between prior ownership states, among others based on prediction of effects of a prepared action, and retrospective ownership states, for which in addition the monitored execution of the action and the sensed actual effects play an important role (e.g., [59] ). Prior ownership states play an important role in self-control: controlling the actual execution of an action; they also entail a form of metacognitive functioning to the extent that such states are made aware and accessible to reflection. One of the issues that play an important role for both prior and retrospective ownership states, is internal simulation as a means for prediction of the (expected) effects of a prepared action. The idea of internal simulation is that in a certain context (which may cover sensed aspects of the external world, but als internal aspects such as the own goals and attitudes) preparation states for actions or bodily changes are activated, which, by prediction links, in turn activate other sensory representation states. The latter states represent the effects of the prepared actions or bodily changes, without actually having executed them. The notion of internal simulation has a longer tradition, and has been put forward, among others, for prediction of effects of one's own prepared motor actions (e.g., [2] ), imagination (e.g., [30] ), processes in a person's own body related to emotional responding (as-if body loops; cf. [13] , [15] ), and recognition or reading another person's emotions or mind (e.g., [26] ).
Thus, based on internal simulation, predictions are made for the effects of prepared actions and based on these, a prior ownership state is generated to support self-control. More specifically, if the predicted effects of a prepared action are valued as satisfactory with respect to the agent´s goals (prior valuation), this may entail a 'go' decision for the actual execution of the action, thus exerting control over action execution. In contrast, predicted effects valued as less satisfactory for the agent´s goals may lead to a 'no go' decision for that option. Over the years the idea has developed that retrospective ownership is based on some form of (retrospective valuing of) co-occurrence of predicted effects and sensed actual effects, after execution of the action. This has traditionally been described by a so-called 'comparator model' inspired by cybernetics and control theory (e.g., [61] ). More recently it has been found that to obtain a retrospective ownership state the predicted effect and the sensed actual effect are in fact not compared but added to each other in some integration process (e.g., [59] , [60] ).
Behaviour options usually have emotional responses associated to them relating to a prediction of a rewarding or aversive consequence in the context of the agent's goals. Therefore, valuing of options to decide for some behaviour, prior to a choice or in retrospection after a choice was made, have a strong emotional component. In recent neurological literature this has been studied in relation to a notion of value as represented in the amygdala (e.g., [1] , [13] , [42] ). In making a decision for a certain behaviour, experiences with the environment (from the past) play an important role. By a retrospective process, the valuations (and their related emotions) of behaviour options are adapted to the experiences, so that the decision making is adapted to the environment as reflected in these past experiences. In humans parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and other brain areas such as hippocampus, basal ganglia, and hypothalamus have extensive, often bidirectional connections with the amygdala (e.g., [42] ). Usually emotional responses are triggered by stimuli for which a predictive association is made of a rewarding or aversive consequence, given the context including the person's goals. Feeling these emotions represents a way of experiencing the value of such a prediction, and to which extent it is positive or negative for the agent's goals: prior valuation of the option. Similarly, feelings of satisfaction are an important element of retrospective valuation of what is experienced after behaviour has been chosen.
In emerging collective decision making the individual internal processes have to be dealt with. A mirroring process may help to achieve that a specific preparation option gets a high activation level for all individuals in a group. However, when the own internal processes would keep on driving the agent in a different direction, no collectiveness will be achieved. Therefore the mirroring will not only have to address the preparation states, but also the emotion-related valuation states that play a main role in the own internal process. This will be discussed subsequently.
The Role of Feelings and Valuing in the Emergence of Collective Action
Usually in the individual process of action selection, before a prepared action comes in focus to be executed, an internal simulation to predict the effects of the action takes place: the action is simulated based on prediction links, and in particular for the associated affective effects, based on as-if body loops that predict the body state which is the basis of the related feeling (e.g., [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] ). Based on these predicted effects a valuation of the action takes place, which may involve or even be mainly based on the associated affective state, as, for example, described in [1] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [42] , [44] . The idea here is that by an as-if body loop each option (prepared action) induces a simulated effect including a feeling which is used to value the option. For example, when a negative feeling and value is induced by a particular option, it provides a negative assessment of that option, whereas a positive feeling and value provides a positive assessment. The decision for executing a prepared action is based on the most positive assessment for it.
This simulation process for prepared actions does not only take place for preparations of self-generated actions, but also for intentions or actions from other persons that are observed. In this way by the mirroring process not only a form of action or intention recognition takes place in the form of activation of corresponding own preparation states by mirror neurons, but in addition also the (predicted) effects are simulated, including the affective effects. This provides an emotionally grounded form of understanding of the observed intention or action, including its valuing, which is shared with the observed agent; see also [17] , pp. 102-104.
Given the important role of the feeling states associated to preparations of actions, it may be unrealistic to expect that a common action can be strong when the individual feelings and valuations about such an action have much variation over a group. When only the preparations for options are tuned to each other while in the meantime still the individual internal processes underlying the decision making remain a strong drive in a different direction, the overall process may result in no collectiveness at all. To achieve emergence of strong collective action, also a shared feeling and valuation for this action has to develop: also mirroring of the associated emotions has to play an important role. When this is achieved, the collective action has a solid shared emotional grounding: the group members do not only intend to perform that action collectively, but they also share a good feeling about it. In this process social media can play an important facilitating role in that (1) they dramatically strengthen the connections between large numbers of individuals, and (2) they do not only support transfer of, for example, beliefs and intentions as such, but also associated emotions reinforcing them. Thus emergence of collectiveness of action is achieved by not only tuning the preparations or intentions for options to each other, but by also tuning the individual internal processes underlying the decision making for these options; see Fig. 2 . This double-effective form of contagion enables both the emergence of a collective action and of a solid emotional grounding for this collective action. 
Computational Models for Social Agents
In this section, it is pointed out how the mechanisms underlying social phenomena discussed from a biological perspective in the previous sections can be used as a basis to obtain computational mechanisms to design social agent models. Note that the current paper aims at mainly presenting the underlying perspective, and not at showing all technical details of models designed according to this perspective. For more technical details of such models, references to other papers are given. For example, in [6] and [39] it is shown in more detail by computational models how mirroring plays a role in emotion recognition. Examples with both mirroring and super mirroring functions can be found in [29] , [58] , [59] . In [29] it is shown how depending on the context represented by super mirror states, activation of a preparation state has a function in either execution, recognition, imagination or imitation of an action. In [58] it is shown how super mirror states play a role in regulation of different forms of social response patterns, and in [59] in prior and retrospective ownership states for an action.
Computational models for the emergence of shared understanding of agentexternal states can be found, for example, in [4] where a computational model for converging emotion spirals (e.g., of fear) is described. In [32] a computational model for cognitive states (beliefs), and affective states (fear) with respect to the external world (in mutual relation) is described which shows how for such combined cases shared understanding emerges. Computational models that have been developed for different types of shared understanding of agent-internal states based on a mirroring mechanism, can be found, for example, in [6] and [58] for affective-focused empathic understanding and social responses, and in [41] for full empathic understanding. Below some of these computational models are discussed a bit further.
A Generic Contagion Model
As a further illustration, first a model is briefly described where a person's internal states are fully determined by other persons' states, and not by other internal processes (taken from [4] ). This model describes at an abstract level the mirroring of any given mental state S (for example, an emotion or intention). An important element is the contagion strength γ SBA for S from person B to person A. This indicates the strength by which the state S of A is affected by the state S of B. It depends on characteristics of the two persons: how expressive B is, how open A is, and how strong the connection from B to A is. In the model it is defined by
Here,  SB is the expressiveness of B for S,  SA the openness of A for S, and α SBA the channel strength for S from B to A. The level q SA of state S in agent A (with values in the interval [0, 1]) over time is determined as follows. The overall contagion strength  SA from the rest of the group towards agent A is  SA =  B≠A  SBA . The aggregated impact q SA * of all these agents upon state S of agent A is:
Given these, the dynamics of the level of state S in each agent A are modelled by:
where f(X, Y) is a combination function, which can be taken, for example, as:
Note that this set of equations for all of the agents (with one equation for each agent) models mutual effects of the levels of state S in different agents on each other by a dynamical systems approach, thus generating patterns as an ongoing interactive multiagent process over time (e.g., see Fig. 3 ). The parameter β SA with values between 0 and 1 indicates a bias towards increasing (upward, β SA > 0.5) or reducing (downward, β SA < 0.5) the impact for the value of the state S of A. Some example simulations for levels of an emotion state S using the latter combination function are shown in Fig. 3 for three agents a, b, c (taken from [4] ). When there are no biases (i.e., all β SA = 0.5), then a shared level emerges which is a weighted average of the individual initial values; an example of this is shown in Fig. 3(a) . The way in which these initial values are weighted depends on the openness, expressiveness and channel parameters. Persons with high openness and low expressivity are considered to be followers, persons with low openness and expressiveness loners. Social media can play an important role because they increase the channel strengths  between individuals for, for example, beliefs and intentions, and also for the associated emotions. In Fig. 3 (b) a situation is shown where biases play a role; here the emerging shared emotion level is higher than any of the initial individual values. Note that the bias of agent b is downward (value 0.3 < 0.5), which indeed for this agent leads to a downward trend first; this trend is changing after time point 2, due to the impact of other, as by then the other agents' emotion levels have substantially increased. 
Integration of Mirroring in Other Internal Processes
The generic model described above applies to any internal state S, but does not describe any interplay between different internal states yet. In more realistic cases such an interplay also contributes to the levels of the states, and therefore the impact of other internal states S' on a given state S has to be integrated with the impact of mirroring on S. For example, Fig. 4 shows an internal model where a certain cognitive state (for example, a sensory representation or belief) has both a cognitive and affective impact on a person's emotions and preparations. Usually such impacts also have feedback loops; an example of this is an as-if body loop (see Section 2). Therefore, often an internal model consists of a number of cycles, for example, as shown in Fig. 4 . In processing, these loops may converge to some equilibrium, when impact from outside is not changing too fast.
An integration of such an internal model with external impact by mirroring can be obtained as follows: to update q SA (t) for a state S, the levels q S'A (t) for the other states S' are taken into account. A general way to do this is by a combination function f that both takes into account the aggregated mirroring impact q SA *(t) and the values q S'A (t) for all (relevant) internal states S'  S. A relatively simple way to define such a combination function is by a weighted average of all these impacts:
and then in the dynamic update model for q SA (t) described above in the combination function f(X, Y) use this q SA **(t) instead of q SA *(t). This way of combination was used in the computational model for emotion-grounded collective decision making described in [32] , based on the principles discussed in Section 4 above. In this case mirroring was applied to both emotion and intention states for any option O:
 mirroring of emotions as a mechanism for how emotions felt about a certain considered decision option O in different individuals mutually affect each other  mirroring of intentions as a mechanism for how strengths of intentions (action tendencies) for a certain decision option O in different individuals affect each other In the model not only intentions of others, but also a person's emotions affect the person's own intentions (the arrow from affective state to preparation state in Fig. 4) . In updating q SA (t) for an intention state S relating to an option O, the intention states of others for O and the values for the emotion state S' for O were taken into account, and aggregated using the approach indicated above. In simulations in most cases not only a collective decision for an intention was emerging, but also a shared underlying feeling. For more details and simulation results, see [32] . Examples of exceptions occur when group members have no openness for others, or are not connected to others.
The Interplay of Intentions, Beliefs and Emotions
An example of a more complex computational model is the collective decision making model ASCRIBE addressing an interplay of beliefs, intentions, and emotions (Agent-based Social Contagion Regarding Intentions, Beliefs and Emotions; cf. [33] ); see Fig. 5 . The internal model used here instantiates part of the general picture of Fig.  4 . Beliefs instantiate the cognitive, emotions the affective, and intentions the preparation states. In this specific internal model it is assumed that an individual's strength of an intention for a certain decision option depends on the person's beliefs (cognitive responding) and emotions (somatic marking) in relation to that option. Moreover, it is assumed that beliefs may generate certain emotions (affective responding), for example of fear, that in turn may affect the strength of beliefs (affective biasing). Note that these latter emotion impacts are independent of specific decision options (e.g., a general fear level). Mirroring was used in three different forms (the dotted arrows in Fig. 5 ): of emotions (both fear and emotions felt about a certain decision option O), of beliefs, and of intentions (for a certain decision option O). In the model for the dynamics of intentions, the impact from mirroring is combined with impact from the emotion states and impact from beliefs, in a similar manner as described above. The same applies, for example, to the impact of beliefs on the emotion state. However, in this model also a different type of combination of mirroring and internal processes takes place, involving impact of fear states to beliefs: it is assumed that some of the parameters, for example, for biases and openness with respect to beliefs are affected by fear levels. For more details of this model, including the model specifications for the internal processes of each agent and a number of example simulations, see [33] ; in [5] an application to a real world crowd behaviour case is presented. 
Abstraction of Complex Internal Agent Models
The agent models discussed above were specified as internal models at the cognitive and affective level, and often involve loops between different internal states, for example, loops between cognitive and affective states. However, under certain assumptions such internal models can be abstracted to behavioural agent models providing more efficient processing, which is important especially when larger numbers of agents are simulated. In [55] , [56] it is addressed how more complex internal agent models can be abstracted to less complex behavioural models. Agent models used for collective social phenomena traditionally are kept simple, and often are specified by simple reactive rules that determine a direct response (output) based on the agent's current perception (input). However, in recent years it is more and more acknowledged that in some cases agent models specified in the simple format as input-output associations are too limited. Dynamics of internal processes of an agent are usually modelled by an internal agent model specifying relations between mental states of the agent. Often such agent models are specified in an executable format following a non-cyclic causal graph. However, for more complex and adaptive types of agents, models may be needed that have a format of dynamical systems including internal loops. Such cyclic interactions are well-known from neurological and brain research areas, for example, loops to model the mutual interaction between affective and cognitive states (see also Fig. 5 above) . Thus, although the non-cyclic graph assumption behind most existing agent models may be useful for the design of (artificial) software agents, it seriously limits applicability for modelling more realistic neurologically inspired processes in natural or human-like agents.
To perform simulations with agents it is often only the behaviour of the agents that matters, and the internal states can be kept out of the simulation model. In [56] an automated transformation is introduced from an internal agent model to a behavioural model, abstracting from the internal states. Within this transformation, techniques for loop abstraction are applied by identifying how equilibrium states depend on inputs for these loops. This loop elimination approach can be applied some underlying assumptions are fulfilled, for example, that the internal dynamics develop an order of magnitude faster than the dynamics external to the agent, that the loop indeed reaches an equilibrium, and that the value for this equilibrium can be determined analytically (by solving the equilibrium equations with the input for the loop as parameter). The idea is that when these assumptions are fulfilled, for each received input, before new input arrives, the agent computes its internal equilibrium states, and based on that determines its behaviour. More on such abstraction methods can be found in [55] , [56] .
Discussion
In this paper it was discussed how biological mechanisms from the new discipline Social Neuroscience can be exploited to obtain computational social agent models, covering both cognitive and affective processes, and their interaction. Core mechanisms used are mirror neurons and internal simulation. Mirror neurons are certain neurons that are activated due to observation of another agent having a corresponding state; e.g., [34] , [45] , [51] . Internal simulation is internal processing copying an external process, for example another person's mental process; e.g., [13] , [15] , [24] , [26] , [30] . It was shown how such agent models can be designed and used to perform simulation and analysis of the emergence of shared understanding of a group of agents. Furthermore, it was shown how such agent models can be used to perform simulation and analysis of the emergence of collective power of a group of agents. This was addressed both in a cognitive or affective or combined sense, so that not only the group members together go for a collective action, but they also share the experience of a good feeling about it, which gives the collective action a solid emotional grounding. It was discussed how such processes depend on the connection strengths between persons, which are strengthened, for example, by social media.
The type of social agents modelled from this perspective are integrative in three different manners. In the first place, within the agent's individual internal mental processes affective and cognitive processes are not separate mental processes, but are fully integrated in a bidirectional manner: cognitive states lead to associated emotions, and emotions affect cognitive states. Secondly, also preparations and sensory representation states affect each other in a bidirectional manner. Thus, the individual internal functioning is modeled using intensively cyclic processes, instead of the traditional view based on relatively simple non-cyclic processes according to a linear sequence from sensing to preparing for an action. In the third place the modelled social agents integrate their individual internal processes with mirroring processes based on the social context in which they function. As a result social agent models are obtained that are integrative in multiple respects: integrating cognitiveaffective, preparing-sensing, and individual-social impacts. Note that also adaptive processes may take place by which the agents for example change their connections between certain internal states. For such adaptive agents the above elements are also integrated with the adaptation processes. This was left outside the scope of the current paper, but is planned as future research.
The perspective put forward in this paper has a number of possible application areas. In the first place it can be used to analyse human social processes in groups, crowds or in societies as a whole. The application to crowd behaviour in emergency situations addressed in [5] is an example of such an application. Other cases address, for example, collective decision making, the construction of social reality (e.g., [8] ), the development of collective consciousness (e.g., [12] ), and global empathy enabling to solve global problems such as climate change (e.g., [47] ), or spiritual and religious experience (e.g., [52] ).
A second area of application addresses socio-technological systems that consist of groups of agents that partly consist of human agents and partly of devices, such as smartphones, and use of social media. For such mixed groups in addition to analysis of what patterns may emerge, also the design of these devices and media can be an important aim, in order to create a situation that the right types of patterns emerge, for example, with safe evacuation in an emergency situation as a consequence.
A third area of application concerns a close empathic interaction between a human and a device. The importance of computational models in a virtual context for 'caring' agents showing empathy has also been well-recognized in the literature; see, for example [3] . In Section 3 it has been discussed how such a virtual agent can have empathic understanding by having the same feeling as the human and knowing that
